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Religious Minorities and Provision of Public Goods: 
Evidence from Rural West Bengal
* 
 
Religious and ethnic minorities across the world face partisan treatment with regard to 
provision of public goods, either as outcome of discriminatory practices or due to historical 
antecedents, such as the caste and religious divides in India. In several districts of West 
Bengal in India concentration of religious minorities, namely Muslims is higher than state and 
country-level averages. We measures access to public goods in rural West Bengal for 
different strata of minority concentration. Using Least Square, Generalized Linear Models 
and Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, we find evidence of strong horizontal inequality against 
Muslims in terms of access to public goods. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition shows that 
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Economic and social discrimination against religious and ethnic groups is common in many 
countries. However, direct evidence is often hard to come by. This paper uses a large sample 
survey of the minority concentrated districts in West Bengal (an eastern state in India with 
approximately the population size that of Germany) to document and formalize evidence on 
horizontal inequality in terms of access to public goods. The results corroborate the recent 
Justice Sachar Committee Report. The report focuses exclusively on the socioeconomic 
conditions of religious minorities in India. We collected primary household level data from 11 
districts in rural West Bengal. We used this to investigate if religious minorities face horizontal 
inequality driven by provision of public good and whether such discrimination is quantifiable. 
Thus, we focus on access to various types of public goods. We classify the minority 
population into three broad strata (Muslims form the largest minority group in West Bengal at 
27% and almost twice the national average - the Indian sub-continent was partitioned on the 
basis of religion in 1947, India remained secular while East and West Pakistan proclaimed 
Islamic statehood). 
 
We estimate the access to targeted and non-targeted public goods such as drinking water, 
distance to health facilities, distance and quality of educational facilities, transport facilities, 
condition of roads, etc. This is based on the level of minority concentration as well as other 
conventional explanatory factors like literacy level, access to information, participation in 
Panchayats (decentralized local self-governments), occupational types, etc. Using standard 
econometric models (viz. Ordinary Least Square and Generalized Linear Models) we 
reported a number of evidence with and without the minority group. In many cases, we 
observed that distance to block headquarter, literacy rate and the district factor for the worst 
quartile rank (according to district-level Human Development Indicator) are significant factors 
behind poor infrastructure and health facilities that minorities are exposed to.  
 
As an extension, we report the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (that helps to decompose 
inter-group inequality into its contributing factors) for four major categories and computed 
both endowment effects and coefficients effects. At least for distance traveled to access 
health services and transport facilities, we report presence of extreme horizontal inequality in 
public provisions for places where minority concentration is rather high. For West Bengal it 
seems to counter the notion that disadvantaged minority groups can significantly influence 
supply of public goods through political representation. The distribution of public goods 
provisions in democracies like India depends critically on such representation.  
 
Finally, these outcomes strongly support the main concern of Justice Sachar Committee 
Report. The paper provides direct evidence on the extent of horizontal inequality in access to 
public goods across religious communities. These results, although limited to a state in India, 
may be applicable to a broader context. In fact, continued discrimination or strategic 
negligence by the state has immense impact on socioeconomic exclusion of the people and 
may cause significant political disturbances. The fact that ethnic strife can result from public 
policies is a very recent subject of analysis with a multidisciplinary outreach. Some of these 
tensions have already surfaced in recent times and taken the shape of regional conflicts and 
moves towards cessation from the country or state. Further evidence on horizontal inequality 
in public provisions and religious/ethnic tensions should reshape public policies in future.   2
1. Introduction 
Religious minorities in India are defined on the basis of the National Commission of 
Minorities Act, 1992.  This includes Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists and Zoroastrians 
(Parsis).
1 It is commonly held that among all religious groups the Muslims are by far the 
worst performers economically.  Note that, unlike the large number of studies on caste 
categories and its impact on economic performances, comparison across religious groups and 
issues in reservation policies in India have been relatively few (Bardhan, Mookherjee and 
Parra Torrado, 2010 for West Bengal; Chin and Prakash, 2010 for India; Duflo, 2005; Pande, 
2003, for India).  This study is a contribution to this scant literature.  We use an extensive 
baseline survey on socio-economic conditions of religious minorities in rural West Bengal, an 
eastern state in India.  West Bengal is one of the most densely populated regions in the 
country and historically shared a high concentration of religious minorities.   
India is historically fragmented in terms of religious, ethnic and caste groups.  The 
prevalence of caste system offers additional distribution-related complexities rarely observed 
elsewhere.  The prevailing socio-economic tension between caste groups, tribal groups 
(Kijima, 2006) and religious groups are often considered responsible for economic 
deprivation and inequality in India.  Moreover, occasional conflicts, riots and general mistrust 
among religious groups make development-related issues quite contentious in the public 
domain.  This provides a strong motivation to study the provision of and access to public 
goods in rural areas where religious and caste issues are still very important.  We hypothesize 
that provision of public goods may be influenced by religious affiliations and regional 
concentration of such groups.  In other words, the present paper studies whether public 
provisions vary significantly across religious groups in rural West Bengal.     
                                                 
1 As per 2001 Census of India the percentages of different minority religious groups in total population Muslims 
are the largest (13.43%) and in West Bengal they are in fact higher than national average (25.25%).   3
Interestingly, the provision of public goods is often used as a political instrument by 
the centralized or provincial or local level self governments (Sharif, 2011 for Sri Lanka 
comparing Sinhalese and Tamils; Sengupta, 2010 for role of political parties towards 
provision of public goods; Joanis, 2010, case of an electoral district in Quebec; Moser, 2008 
for Madagascar; Banerjee and Somanathan, 2007 for rural India; Luo, Zhang, Huang and 
Rozelle, 2007 for rural China; Besley, Pande, Rahman and Rao, 2004 for South India, Crost 
and Kambhampati, 2010, for North India testing the role of local democracy in provision of 
school infrastructure, etc.).  Empirically, various country studies substantiate this notion that 
the distribution of public goods tend to vary significantly across ethnic communities (for 
example, Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan, 2005 for rural India; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005 for 
western Kenya; Brasington, 2003 for school districts and racial divide in the US; Alesina, 
Baqir and Easterly, 1999, for US cities, metropolitan areas and urban counties, etc.).  
However, none of these studies explicitly discuss provision of public goods across 
communities when religious affiliation is the main explanatory factor. 
  The disadvantage facing certain ethnic and religious groups may be seen as an 
outcome of political reservations in favor of others. Pande (2003) shows that political 
reservations lead to higher transfers to the groups that benefit from reservations, but there is 
typically no evidence in favor of a complete policy commitment.  However, Duflo (2005) 
argues that if the preferences of the potential beneficiaries of reservations do not differ from 
rest of the population, then reservation does not offer a premium.  On the point of 
preferences, Besley et al. (2004), defines publicly provided private goods as low spillover 
goods and include individual or household level cash transfers, ration cards, water 
connections, etc.  These individualized services depend strongly on the nature of 
representation in the local governments as also the identity of the leader.  The poorer sections   4
will also have high preferences for the non-targeted public good (roads, schools, irrigation 
canals, railway stations, bridges, etc.) in their hamlets.   
We evaluate the conditions of religious minorities in eleven districts of West Bengal 
in terms of access to public goods.  For India in general, the Sachar Committee Report (2006) 
is the first ever report that systematically analyzes the conditions of religious minorities.  The 
committee was set up for analyzing available data on the spatial concentration, occupational 
patterns, assets, general socio-economic conditions, employment share in public and private 
sector, access to education and health services, infrastructure and credit, etc. for religious 
minorities all over India.  It reported extremely poor conditions facing religious minorities 
(specifically, Muslims).
2  Even within the larger disadvantaged communities across religious 
groups, affirmative actions in education and jobs for Hindu lower caste and tribal population 
(Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, respectively) has pushed the Muslims at a relatively 
disadvantaged position.  
  The caste classification in India, which exists mainly among followers of Hindu 
religion, (but, also present among Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, etc.; Sachar 
Committee, 2006, p.6-7, Table 1.1 and 1.2) functions as a prejudice against certain groups.  
Lower caste population faces statistical discrimination by providers of public goods and 
suffers from lack of incentives for improvement (Arrow, 1972; Akerlof, 1976).  Thus, caste-
based social relation creates a low-level equilibrium trap culminating into self-fulfilling 
prophecy.
3  According to Sachar Committee (2006), “Caste, religion and regional/linguistic 
differentials in economic, social and political spheres in India have a historical basis and are 
deeply influenced by the extant socio-economic relationships, some of which have persisted 
                                                 
2 Economic and social integration of Muslims has many implications as discussed in the literature.  See for 
example Bisin et al (2008) for Muslims in UK. The Sachar Committee Report (2006, p. 11) observes how this 
particular community imagine themselves and is imagined by other socio-religious communities in India: “In 
general, Muslims complained that they are constantly looked upon with a great degree of suspicion not only by 
certain sections of society but also by public institutions and governance structures”.     
3 Discussion of taste-based prejudice or discrimination (Becker, 1969; Welch, 1967) ignores historical 
perspective on which stability of institutions such as caste system or religious groups depend.   5
for centuries.  The Indian socio-economic fabric is more complex than ordinarily believed 
because of various unique layers and segments, into which Indian society is divided and sub-
divided.” (p. 4).     
The religious divide between Hindus and other much smaller religious groups is 
equally complex for the post-partition secular India and deeply rooted in its history (see 
Morris and Adelman, 1980 for the relationship between religious factors and economic 
development). This paper does not have the scope to discuss how the transition over a couple 
of centuries has left the majority of Muslims in India in considerable economic disadvantage 
vis-à-vis other religious groups.
4  Besides, the results are obtained from a survey of eleven 
districts in only one state.  Many districts in West Bengal have concentration of Muslims over 
20% of the total population and this is higher than the national average.  Apart from West 
Bengal this is also true for many districts in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Andhra 
Pradesh, Kerala, Sikkim, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, etc. with respect to Muslims, 
Christians, Sikhs or Buddhists.
5  For West Bengal we utilize a recent household survey of 
minority concentrated districts commissioned by the Ministry of Minority Affairs, 
Government of India.  The extensive survey has yielded several interesting socio-economic 
features which we discuss in section 3.   
Finally, the term ‘religious minority’ is a multi-layered construction.  Any one-to-one 
correlation between a particular religion and level of development may fail to do justice to 
the complex realities.  It touches politically and socially sensitive issues in religious 
discrimination and deprivation.
6  As one of the related reports points out: “it is not the 
absence of physical amenities (only) that are preventing minorities from coming forward, it is 
                                                 
4 Although partition in 1947 is a historical event, most discussions on current religious context in India finds its 
influence ramified along economic and political issues.  Ahmed (2005, p. 1) comments that the politicization of 
religion in post-secular post-globalization India has transformed Indians into ‘hauntological’ beings.     
5 In fact Gujarat is an exception in the list or though it has very high Muslim concentration in many coastal 
districts, they are better performers when compared to national average.  
6 During the course of our survey words such as ‘discrimination’ and ‘deprivation’ were carefully articulated to 
the respondents.     6
also the contextual background.”
7 While the Sachar Committee Report agrees that 
widespread perception of discrimination among the Muslim community needs to be 
addressed, it also admits that there are hardly any empirical studies that establish 
discrimination.  Section 2 discusses data and methodology.  Section 3 offers the results and 
section 4 concludes.  Tables and methodologies are relegated to the appendix.      
 
2.  Data and Methodology 
  In the absence of appropriate data on religion specific socio-economic parameters in 
India it is a vexing task to continuously, even periodically, assess the extent and intensity of 
development deficits facing minority communities in general and Muslims in particular.
8  We 
collected primary household level data for 11 districts in rural West Bengal during 2007-08.  
The main hypothesis is the following.  Is the minority concentration in the rural areas an 
important determinant of the provision of public goods and social infrastructure?  In this 
paper, public goods and infrastructure include, ‘distance travelled to fetch drinking water’, 
‘access to health facilities provided by the government’, ‘nearest bus stop’, ‘nearest railway 
station’, ‘nearest post office’, ‘number of teachers in schools’, ‘paved roads in the villages’, 
‘electrification of houses’, etc.  Needless to mention, availability of infrastructure and public 
goods are well known for their influence on economic growth and development in any 
country.     
The districts within West Bengal are selected on the basis of concentration of 
minority population, religion-specific socio-economic indicators and an indicator constructed 
from the various types of basic amenities available to the population.  The four religion-
                                                 
7See, Expert Committee Meeting on Baseline Survey of Minority Concentration Districts, Indian Council for 
Social Science Research, p. 4.   
8 Sachar Committee based their observations on Census of India 2001 and argued that huge deficits exist.  Due 
to unavailability of data, the Ministry of Minority Affairs, Government of India commissioned a baseline survey 
in ninety districts across the country in 2007-08 of which eleven are in West Bengal.  The survey was conducted 
in the rural areas only.  This baseline survey was commissioned under the aegis of the Indian Council of Social 
Science Research.   7
specific socio-economic indicators are: (i) overall literacy rate, (ii) female literacy rate, (iii) 
work participation rate, and (iv) female work participation rate.  On the other hand, the four 
basic amenities are: (i) percentage of households with pucca (concrete) walls, (ii) percentage 
of households with safe drinking water, (iii) percentage of households with electricity and 
(iv) percentage of households with W/C toilets.   
We restrict our analysis to those districts in West Bengal (henceforth, WB) in which 
(a) the minority (Muslim) population is more than 20%, and (b) the average of the religion-
specific socio-economic indicators, and/ or (c) the average of the basic amenities indicators, 
are both lower than the respective national averages.  The districts chosen have Muslim 
population well above the all-India average.  They also report poor performance in terms of 
either religion specific socio-economic indicators and/ or basic amenities indicators.  Both of 
these can be treated as indicators of backwardness. The districts selected for the study include 
Uttar Dinajpur, Dakshin Dinajpur, Malda, Murshidabad, Birbhum, Nadia, South 24 Parganas, 
Bardhaman, Coochbehar, Haora and North 24 Parganas.
9  The first nine districts have lower 
than national socio-economic averages.  For Haora and North 24 Parganas the ‘basic 
amenities’ indicators are lower than the national average.  Table 1 provides some of the 
important indicators used for these districts. So far the Muslim minority population is 
concerned, some of the districts such as Bardhaman, Haora or North 24 Parganas perform 
quite well in terms of the state HDI rank but fall short of national averages for religion 
specific or basic amenities indicators. This highlights the fact that the disparity between non-
Muslim population and Muslim population is worse in these districts. 
  
                                                 
9 Table 6 in Appendix 2 shows that the share of religious minorities (predominantly Muslims) has increased 
unambiguously over the last three decades.  This may have been caused by the natural rate of population growth 
in India and follow the trend among Muslims.  It may also have been caused by legal/illegal immigration from 
Bangladesh.  However, the population growth is marginal for most districts and it could not have lowered per 
capita availability of public goods to the very low level as one observes currently.  It may certainly have 
worsened an already poor resource base.            8
Methodology 
We adopted a stratified multi-stage sampling design in which households are the 
targeted sampling units chosen from rural areas only.  The first stage units (FSU) were the 
2001 Census villages constituting the primary sampling units.  In the first stage, the 
development blocks (comprising of a number of census villages) were classified into three 
strata on the basis of the percentage of Muslim population.  The first stratum constitutes the 
top 20% blocks, second comprises of the middle 50% and the third represents the bottom 
30%.  Ideally, the strata should have been constructed with census villages. However, 
religion-specific population data at the village level is ‘classified’ and therefore not available. 
For the next step, in case of districts with population in excess of 0.5 million a total of 30 
villages were chosen and distributed in the three strata.  The 30 villages distributed in the 
three stratums are chosen by the method of probability proportional to size.  Subsequently, a 
total of 30 households were chosen from each village via random sampling with replacement.  
The households selected by standard listing method were proportionate to religious groups in 
the total population of the village.  For large FSUs one intermediate stage of sampling had 
been the selection of hamlet groups. If village population is in excess of 1200 individuals, the 
entire village population is distributed into hamlet groups with each hamlet group covering 
population of 600.  The hamlet group with highest concentration of minority population is 
chosen with probability one and one more is chosen from the remaining hamlet groups 
randomly.  This approach directly follows the sampling methodology adopted by the National 
Sample Survey of India
10.  A typical hamlet group consists of 600 individuals.  In brief, 
therefore, we had 30 villages in each district if district population exceeded 0.5 million 
(which is generally the case in West Bengal) and 30 households from each village.  On 
average, this amounts to 4500 individuals surveyed in each district for eleven districts.     
                                                 
10 See National Sample Survey Organisation (2001, 2010) for general discussions on concepts and definitions.      9
  


























Coochbehar 23.34  732  66.3 
(56.1) 
11 10.49  40.2 
U. Dinajpur  47.36  778  47.89 
(37.51) 
13 9.2  29.7 
D. Dinajpur  24.02  677  63.59  
(55.12) 
13 11.6  44.9 
Malda 49.72  881  50.28 
(41.25) 
17 16.2  38.2 
Murshidabad 63.67  1101  54.3 
(47.6) 
 17.8 35.4 
Nadia 25.4  1172.3  66.14 
(59.58) 
9 24  35.3 
North 24 Pgs.  24.22  2182  78.06 
(71.72) 
3 47.2  40.9 
South 24 Pgs.  33.24  694  69.45 
(41.1) 
8 21.2  36.6 
Haora 24.2  2912.8  83.2 
(70.1) 
2 47.4  41.6 
Bardhaman 20.36  982  70.17 
(60.9) 
5 35.52  43.2 
Birbhum 35.08  664  61.48 
(51.55) 
14 16.9  38.7 
West Bengal  25.25  903  77.0 
(59.61) 
- -  - 
All India  13.43  325  75.3 
(53.7) 
- 41.7  45.8 
 Source:  Census, 2001; State Human Development Report, 2004   10
Survey Questions 
For the survey, two types of questionnaires – a household questionnaire and a village 
schedule were used.  The household questionnaire was used for identifying socio-economic 
factors influencing development, and for reporting individual as well as collective 
experiences of people living in these areas.  The village schedule was used for collecting 
village-level data on infrastructure, general access to basic amenities including health 
facilities, education, land holdings and irrigation, etc.
11     
Provision of public good refers to includes following variables of critical import: (i) 
percentage of households using public source of drinking water, (ii) percentage of paved 
roads in the village, (iii) average distance travelled for accessing public health facility, (iv) 
distance to nearest bus stop, (v) distance to nearest railway station and (vi) an index of 
educational infrastructure for the village (or nearest) primary school.  In addition, we 
considered the following two variables: (vii) percentage of houses electrified and (viii) 
percentage of households that do not avail of institutional delivery (child birth).  Strictly 
speaking, (vii) and (viii) do not represent public provision of social infrastructure.  While 
(vii) has characteristics of a private good, for rural areas in India the overhead cost is often 
very high and consequently, even richer sections find electricity connections prohibitively 
expensive.  It becomes the responsibility of public sector companies to offer connections at 
subsidized rates.
12 Next, percentage of households who do not avail of institutional delivery 
is actually an outcome variable.  However, as a measure of the availability of publicly 
provided health facility including trained doctors, nurses and necessary equipments, it carries 
substantial importance.  In particular, the distance travelled for availing of health facility, 
                                                 
11 These are usually available from various government offices, like the office of the District Magistrate, the 
Block Development Officer, the Agricultural Department, the office of the Panchayat Pradhan (head of the 
local level self government), ICDS (Integrated Child Development Service) centres etc. 
12 However, state and federal governments in India offers certain schemes for provision of electricity to rural 
areas, which have public good characteristics to the supply of electricity.      11
including childbirth is an important indicator of development at the village level.
13      
The results are based on village level data.  The variables are averages for households 
surveyed in each village and include percentage of households using public source of 
drinking water, etc.  For some of the other variables, such as, distance to the nearest railway 
station, we have used the village schedule data.  For assessing public provision of educational 
infrastructure we constructed an index comprising of teacher-student ratio, type of school 
building, number of classrooms in the school, drinking water facility, toilet facility and 
percentage of students who received free books.  For example, if the school building is pucca 
(with concrete roof) it is given a value of 3, if it is semi pucca (concrete and clay 
constructions) the value is 2, 1 if it is kutcha (only clay construction and no concrete) and 0 if 
the school has no building.  Similarly, drinking water facility and toilet facility are given 
value 1 each, if available, and 0 if otherwise.   
 
3.   Econometric Methodology and Results 
This section empirically investigates if the percentage of Muslim population at the 
village level is an important explanatory variable for provision of public goods and for the 
outcome variables. We regressed each of these public goods/ social infrastructure on the 
percentage of Muslim population in the village adequately controlled for other variables. Our 
econometric exercise essentially aims to explain whether provision of public goods listed 
above is biased against concentration of Muslim population in villages.  To this end, we 
control for average land holding at the household level, distance of the block head-quarter 
from the village, distance of the nearest town from the village, percentage of male (landless) 
agricultural labourer in the village.  Further, we consider literacy rate at the village level, 
percentage of households who read newspapers, percentage of households which actively 
                                                 
13 Everywhere the village health centres are severely limited in terms of instruments and facilities and therefore 
offers little to the villagers.  Unavailability of doctors, nurses and medicines forces patients to travel to far off 
towns on a regular basis (see for example Kar, 2011).      12
participate in Gram Panchayat meetings and the average annual expenditure of households.  
These are directly computed from the household survey.  Data on educational infrastructure, 
distance of village from the block head quarter and the nearest town are obtained from village 
survey data.   
So, for each type of public good we estimated the following regression equation. 
  i i i i i u D X M y + + + + = θ β γ α
~
     (1) 
where  = percentage of Muslim population in village i,  = vector of control variables for 
village i,  = dummy if the district belongs to the lowest quartile in HDI rank, and  = 
disturbance term. 
i M i X
~
i D i u
The set of independent variables are: distance travelled for accessing public health 
facilities (in Km.) [computed as average distance travelled for accessing government hospital/ 
dispensary/clinic and primary health centres from the village], distance of bus stop (in Km.), 
distance of railway station (in Km.), average years of highest education [computed as average 
over households in each village based on the highest level of education for male and female 
members at the household level], proportion of households not accessing government facility 
for child birth (or, non-institutional delivery), proportion of paved roads, proportion of 
households electrified and proportion of households who have access to publicly provided 
drinking water.  
On the other hand, the set of explanatory variables are (i) percentage of minority 
(Muslim) population in the village, (ii) average land holding (in bigha = 1/3 acre), (iii) 
distance of block head quarter (in Km.)
14, (iv) nearest town (in Km.), (v) reading newspaper, 
(vi) political participation [i.e., the percentage of households participating in Gram 
Panchayat meetings], (vii) agricultural labour (male), (viii) dummy if the district (to which 
the village belongs) belongs to the lowest quartile of HDI ranks for West Bengal as of 2004, 
                                                 
14 Block is an administrative boundary below the district level.   13
and finally, (ix) dummy if the village average household expenditure lies in the group of 
bottom 20% of villages in the state.  As we have already mentioned, we are interested in 
observing how far the provision of various public goods is explained by village level 
concentration of Muslim population.  Percentage of Muslim population is our main regressor 
while the variables listed from (ii) through (ix) are control variables.  
We also estimated the same econometric model by using dummy for different strata 
of Muslim population. The strata with top 20%, middle 50% and bottom 30% minority 
population in each district are arranged in descending order and categorized as S1, S2 and S3 
respectively. The villages fall into these three categories.  Thus, any two dummies can be 
used simultaneously along with the intercept term.  The strata dummies are defined below. 
otherwise.   0      
stratum   20%    top  to belongs      village if   1 1
=
= i S i  
otherwise.   0      
stratum   50%   middle    to belongs      village if   1 2
=
= i S i  
otherwise.   0      
stratum   30%   bottom    to belongs      village if   1 3
=
= i S i  











= and 3 2 1   ,  
~
  and i  
Therefore, the reformulated regression equation is given by  
   i u D X S i y i i i + + + + = θ β φ α
~ ~
   (2) 
where, φ = vector of parameters for strata dummies. 
  The econometric specifications in (1) and (2) are reduced forms of a choice problem 
of the government for allocating public goods across villages with ‘religious concentration’ 
as one of the determinants. Deliberate discrimination on the part of the state would mean that 
areas with minority concentration are neglected.  It could also imply that resource allocation 
through representation in a democracy like India may be less functional than usually   14
contemplated.  Resource allocations may be subject not only to inter-regional tug-of-war, but 
also the overall economic condition of the state and its fiscal and political relations with the 
federal government.  If one or more of these conditions go against minority groups, 
concentration of minority population is expected to have a negative impact on the provision 
of public goods.  More importantly, the argument of reverse causality i.e. poor provision of 
public good influencing minority concentration is not tenable on the ground of individual 
rationality.  If provision of public goods is poor in some villages then there is no reason why 
people, minority or majority, would choose to settle there unless there is a sudden influx due 
to purely exogenous reasons like political or religious persecution elsewhere.  Table 6 does 
not indicate that there have been remarkable changes in the trends.  So, the question of 
reverse causality is firmly ruled out.  Finally, the basic difference between the econometric 
specifications (1) and (2) is the following.  For relation (1) the relation is linear with Muslim 
concentration and for (2) the intercept shifts with the dummy (if, statistically significant).  
Average land holding represents average asset level of the village households.  In 
addition, we consider average annual household expenditure used as a proxy for average 
annual income.  To measure the extent of intra-village inequality, we use landless agricultural 
labour as percentage of the village population.  It is often argued that villages proximate to 
block headquarter and towns receive better public facilities, perhaps by persistent lobbying 
for public goods.  Hence, we consider distance to block headquarter and distance from the 
nearest town (in kilometres) as important explanatory factors.  The percentage of households 
with at least one member regularly reading newspapers is also used as a control in the 
regression analysis to capture the level of literacy.  It also reflects the awareness of the 
households regarding benefits of accessing health facilities, safe drinking water, government 
schemes currently operational, etc.
15 Regarding provision of public goods and social 
                                                 
15 Literacy itself is not a very good indicator because it is defined as ability to write one’s name correctly.    15
infrastructure the role of Gram Panchayat is generally believed to have a positive impact.  
This can be measured in many ways.  We worked with household participation in Gram 
Panchayat meetings as a measure of the emphasis on village level decentralization.  
  Since the data captures a cross-section of villages, one should expect a lot of 
heterogeneity.  However, as we considered dependent as well as explanatory variables either 
as percentages or averages across households, the level effect is neutralized.  Hence, we 
regress the first set of equations by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  It is followed by 
estimation using the Generalized Linear Model (GLM) where the dependent variables are in 
proportions.  Moreover, both the Breusch-Pagan test and the White test confirm presence of 
heteroscedasticity.  Thus, we re-estimated the model for the robust standard errors of 
coefficients.  For the entire set of equations where  is regressed on   heteroscedasticity-
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 , where  j β

= estimated coefficient 
for j
th  regressor,  i u  = estimated residual from OLS,  ij r   =    residual from regressing   on 
other  and  = sum of squared residuals from this regression.  Regression equations 
include either percentage of minority population or the minority population strata at the 
district level. 
th i j x
s x' j SSR
  Additionally, for the public good/ social infrastructures that are measured in 
proportion, we estimated the corresponding model by GLM with logit link.  Let us briefly 
justify adoption of this method.  If a regressand is reported in percentage and the variable is 
restricted to [0 1] interval, then GLM with logit link and the binomial family is a natural 
selection.  It is because of the fact that the functional forms automatically impute the 
endogenous variable in the [0 1] interval.
16   
                                                 
16 For more on methodology, see Appendix 2.     16
  Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the endogenous variables and the 
explanatory variables for the three strata separately. The results of econometric estimation are 
given in Tables 3, 4 and 5.  In addition to the results of OLS (Table 3) and GLM with logit 
link (Table 4) we report the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition (Table 5).  The last approach 
does not yield perceptible difference compared to the general case.  However, it identifies and 
quantifies factors behind average inter-group discrimination and decomposes it into two 
parts: those due to different observable characteristics or “endowments” across groups and 
those due to different effects of characteristics or “coefficients” of groups.   
 
Results and discussion 
  Let us now explain the results from the regressions.  First, we provide the linear 
regression results with strata dummies corrected for heteroscedasticity in Table 3.  Each 
column in Table 3 reports the regression results for different types of public goods with and 
without minority (Muslim) concentration at the village level. Not surprisingly, distance 
travelled to access public amenities such as transport and health services are positively and 
significantly affected by proximity to block headquarters and towns. This implies that 
although we do not find evidence of direct discrimination in provision of public goods against 
minority clusters, general incapacity or reluctance among public authorities in delivering the 
basic requirements cannot be ruled out.  It seems that awareness, access to information 
through newspapers etc. and proximity to larger towns, create positive influence on public 
goods provision.  On the flip side therefore, geographic distance and insufficient collective 
action due to lack of awareness push large sections to direct exclusions.   
  In fact, villages dominated by agricultural labourers report large distances travelled 
for accessing railway connections and this is significant at 1% level.  Furthermore, as there 
are fewer villages in quartile 4, the distance travelled to access public goods goes up   17
significantly – explaining extreme marginalization for a considerable section of the 
population.  Note that, we do not find evidence of a negative relationship between lack of 
public goods and percentage share of minority population at the village level.  However, 
when the minority population is distributed over various strata, there is clear evidence of this 
negative correlation.  For strata 1, i.e. villages with minority population in the top 20% 
category, we find that the distance covered for accessing health facilities is longer (see Tables 
2 and 3).  All of these regression analyses have reasonably high adjusted-R
2 values.   
  Next, the GLM in Table 4 compares results once by including Muslim population as a 
regressor and then excluding it.  When Muslim population at the village level is included, 
proportion of households not using institutional delivery is positive and significant.  It implies 
that larger the Muslim population lower is the rate of institutional delivery.  Similarly, when 
Muslims are included, distance to nearest township goes up and that can be construed as a 
factor behind lower childbirth in hospitals.  But it seems to be a rather general phenomenon, 
as the coefficient (0.0032) goes up even when Muslims are excluded.  This is indicative of 
historic development deficits that have not been attended to.   
  Similarly, high proportion of agricultural labour lowers availability of paved roads, 
houses with electricity, houses with public provision of drinking water, etc.  Once again, 
inclusion of Muslim population has stronger impact on non-availability of drinking water 
through public taps.  Moreover, participation in local meetings and activities surrounding 
local self-governance seems to have detrimental effect on availability of paved roads and 
electricity connections.  Since, the data does not allow us to venture further into such 
relationships, we suggest that there could be a reverse causation in effect, i.e., respondents 
who face lesser and lesser access to these facilities are involved in such participation at an 
increasing rate.                 18
  Notwithstanding, inclusion of the bottom quartile dummy for district HDI rank 
generates expected signs: greater is the number of villages in this quartile, with and without 
the minority share, availability of paved roads get worse (-0.182 and -0.176) and dependence 
on publicly provided drinking water is higher (0.166 and 0.153).  Since inclusion of minority 
population in the bottom quartile makes both coefficients stronger and statistically significant 
at 1% level, there may be a clear case of negligence on the part of the state.   
  Finally, Table 5 provides the results of Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for analyzing 
the underlying causes of differences, if any, in public goods delivery in two different sets of 
villages based on concentration of minority population.  In the absence of any discrimination, 
on average all the villages would have similar access to publicly provided facilities. The 
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition technique is employed to verify this.  The approach identifies 
and quantifies the causes of average extent of inter-group discrimination and decomposes it 
into two effects – those due to different observable characteristics or ‘endowments’ across 
groups and those due to different effects of characteristics or ‘coefficients’ of groups.
17  
According to our specification, Group A villages belong to S3 category containing villages 
within blocks with bottom 30% minority population.  On the other hand, Group B villages 
belong to blocks with top 20% (S1) and middle 50% (S2) minority population.  Based on 
these two categories we estimated the group specific regression models 1 and 2 and then 
performed the Blinder-Oaxaca three fold decomposition to see whether there is any 
significant difference in the dependent variable between the two groups.  We have also 
conducted the Oaxaca Decomposition for the Muslim Dummy with Muslim Population ≤ 
20%, Muslim Population ≤ 30%, Muslim Population ≤ 40% and Muslim Population ≤ 50%.  
We only report the Oaxaca Decomposition result for Muslim Population ≤ 30% [where 
Muslim Dummy (M) =1 for Muslim Population ≤ 30% and = 0 otherwise] for distance to 
                                                 
17 For a general description of the methodology, see Appendix 2.   19
public health facilities, distance to nearest bus stop, distance to railway station and average 
years of highest education.  For others, we get similar results regarding the overall difference 
between the two groups of villages based on these classifications. 
  Table 5 reports models 1 and 2 with endowment effects and overall effects for these 
categories.  For example, the endowment effect of distance travelled for accessing public 
health facilities is negative and significant.  It implies that the expected change in group B’s 
mean outcome regarding access to public health is negative.  Next, the coefficient effect of 
distance to railway station (for Muslims in the ≤ 30% category) is influenced by distance to 
block head quarter and it is negative (-6.0675) and significant at 5% level.  This implies that 
the relevant group expects the ‘distance to railway station’ as explained by ‘distance to block 
head quarter’ to go up if they belonged to the top 70% category of minority concentration.  In 
addition, the overall effect (endowment and coefficient) is also negative and significant at 5% 
level.   
  This immediately suggests that profiling of minority groups in highly concentrated 
regions leads to lower and lower access to basic public amenities.  Not surprisingly, the 
interaction between newspaper subscription and the highest level of education is positive and 
significant and weaker for the concentration of Muslims above 30%.  In general, therefore, 
most of the results obtained from the OLS and GLM models are corroborated in the 
decomposition exercise along with further evidence suggesting presence of strong horizontal 
inequality regarding provision of public goods.    
  In terms of regression analysis reported in Tables 3 and 4 we find that higher 
concentration of Muslim population does not affect provision of public goods in some cases, 
indicating an absence of religion specific discrimination. However, in some of the other cases 
we find that there is a clear indication of discrimination based on religion. In fact, the 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition as reported in Table 5 suggests the presence of religion   20
specific discrimination. However, one should be careful in interpreting the results in the 
context of causality. We cannot test the hypothesis of causality in a strict statistical sense 
because our data is over a cross section of villages. However, we already argued in Section 3 
that on the ground of individual rationality poor provision of public goods can not have a 
negative impact on the concentration of Muslim population. So any significant relation 
between provision of public goods and Muslim concentration implies a religion specific 
discrimination. 
    
5.   Concluding Remarks 
While economic and social discrimination against certain religious and ethnic groups 
is common in many countries, direct evidence is often hard to come by.  We used a large 
sample survey of the minority concentrated districts in West Bengal to document and 
formalize evidence on horizontal inequality in terms of access to public goods.  The results 
corroborate the recent Justice Sachar Committee Report focusing exclusively on the 
socioeconomic conditions of religious minorities in India.  We collected primary household 
level data from 11 districts in rural West Bengal.  We used this to investigate if religious 
minorities face horizontal inequality driven by provision of public good and whether such 
discrimination is quantifiable.   
  Thus, we focused on access to various types of public goods.  We classified the 
minority population (Muslims form the largest minority group in West Bengal and almost 
twice the national average), into three broad strata.  We estimated their access to targeted and 
non-targeted public goods such as drinking water, distance to health facilities, distance and 
quality of educational facilities, transport facilities, condition of roads, etc.   This was based 
on the level of minority concentration as well as other conventional explanatory factors like   21
literacy level, access to information, participation in Panchayats, occupational types, etc.  For 
the standard OLS and GLM models we reported evidence with and without the minority 
group dummy.  In many cases, we observed that distance to block headquarter, literacy rate 
and the district dummy for the worst quartile rank (according to district-level Human 
Development Indicator) are significant factors behind poor infrastructure and health facilities 
that minorities are exposed to.   
  As an extension, we reported the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for four major 
categories and computed both endowment effects and coefficients effects.  At least for 
‘distance travelled to access health services’ and ‘transport facilities’, we report presence of 
extreme horizontal inequality in public provisions when minority concentration is rather high.  
For West Bengal it seems to counter the notion that disadvantaged minority groups can 
significantly influence supply of public goods through political representation.   
  Moreover, these outcomes strongly support the main concern of Justice Sachar 
Committee Report.  The paper provides direct evidence on the extent of horizontal inequality 
in access to public goods across religious communities.  These results, although limited to a 
state in India, may be applicable to a broader context.  In fact, continued discrimination or 
strategic negligence by the state has immense impact on socio-economic exclusion of the 
people and may cause significant political disturbances.  The fact that ethnic strife can result 
from public policies is a very recent subject of analysis with a multidisciplinary outreach 
(Kanbur, Rajaram and Varshney, 2011).  Some of these tensions have already surfaced in 
recent times and taken the shape of regional conflicts and moves towards cessation from the 
country or state.  Further evidence on horizontal inequality in public provisions and 
religious/ethnic tensions should reshape public policies in future.             
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Appendix 1 
 
Table 2: Averages and Standard Deviations (within parentheses) across all villages and 
S1, S2 and S3 classified villages for the dependent and independent variables: 
Variables  Across all 
Villages  S1 S2 S3 
Distance travelled for accessing 





































Proportion of Households not 
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Source: Own Household and Village Survey Data. 
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Table 3: Linear Regression Results with Robust HC3 Standard Errors 
 















































(0.0082)  -  0.0083 
(0.0065)  -  0.0209 
(0.0233)  -  -0.0108* 
(0.0027)  - 
Average Land 
Holding 
(in bigha = 1/3 
acre) 



















































































































S1 Dummy  -  1.2184# 
(0.6171)  -  0.2668 
(0.4603)  -  3.0342 
(2.1795)  -  -0.4804# 
(0.1985) 

















2  0.1863 0.1964 0.1955 0.1911 0.2012 0.2060 0.3889 0.3622 
Adjusted R
2  0.1647 0.1751 0.1747 0.1702 0.1779 0.1829 0.3712 0.3437 
Note: # and * indicate significant at 5% and 1% levels of significance.  
Source: Survey data.   26
Table 4: Marginal Effects using Generalized Linear Models 
Note: # and * indicate significant at 5% and 1% levels of significance.  




















































Muslim Population  0.0021* 
(0.0005)  -  0.0005 
(0.0004)  -  0.0002 
(0.0004)  -  -0.0009 
(0.0005)  - 
Average Land 
Holding 



















































News Paper  -0.0030* 
(0.0010) 
-0.0030* 































(0.0010)  - - 
Agricultural Labour 












% of Paved Roads  -0.1665# 
(0.0739) 
-0.1461# 
(0.0730)  - - - - - - 
Bottom quartile 
Dummy for district 

















S1 Dummy   -  0.0524 
(0.0415)  -  0.0022 
(0.0321)  -  -0.0314 
(0.0301)  -  0.0035 
(0.0446) 



















Deviance  130.6074  135.4457  80.3949 80.7123 76.7427 76.5884  145.1103  146.1182 
Pearson  111.7259  115.1816  72.5962 72.9353 68.3885 68.3501  120.8442  121.5778 
Source: Survey data. 
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Table 5: Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition with Robust HC3 Standard Errors 
Regressand 

























Model 1 (A)  
(S3 Dummy=1)  - - - - - -  -2.0153# 
(0.9466)  0.3705
Model 2 (B)  












(Km)  Endowments  - - - - - - - - 
Model 1 (A)  
(S3 Dummy=1)  - - - - - -  -2.2811# 
(1.0679)  0.3343 Distance of 
Bus Stop 
(Km)  Model 2 (B)  
(S3 Dummy=0)  -  0.1889* 
(0.0573)    -0.0256# 
(0.0114) 
-0.0435# 
(0.0193)  - -  0.2167
Model 1 (A) 
(M Dummy=1 if 
Muslim 
Population≤30%) 
- -  0.3382* 
(0.1054)  - -  0.2401# 
(0.0976)  - 0.2527
Model 2 (B) 
(M Dummy=0 
otherwise) 
- - - - -     0.2005
Endowments  - -  -1.3264# 





Coefficients  -  -6.0675# 
(2.7290)  - - - - - - 
Model 1 (A) 
(M Dummy=1 if 
Muslim 
Population≤30%) 
- - -  0.0575* 
(0.0098)  -  -0.0307# 
(0.0136)  - 0.6094




(0.0339)  - -  0.0414* 





Coefficients  - - - - - - - - 
 
Note: # and * indicate significant at 5% and 1% levels of significance.  
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Appendix 2 
Table 6. Changing Population Share of Religious Minorities in West Bengal   








West  Bengal  21.51 23.61 25.25 
Bardhaman 17.6  19.55  19.78 
Birbhum  30.98 33.06 35.08 
Coochbehar  20.78 23.34 24.24 
Dakshin  Dinajpur  35.79 23.51 24.02 
Haora  20.17 22.22 24.44 
Malda  45.27 47.49 49.72 
Murshidabad 58.67  61.4  63.67 
Nadia  24.08 24.92 25.41 
North 24 Parganas  22.5  24.17  24.22 
South 24 Parganas  26.82  29.94  33.24 
Uttar  Dinajpur  35.79 45.35 47.36 
         
Data Source: Census of India, various years        
 
GLM 
It is well known that GLMs are flexible enough to allow regression-based modelling for 
normal as well as non-normal data.  To illustrate, suppose that a variable , is to be 
explained by a set of K explanatory variables
1 0   , ≤ ≤ y y
) ,..., , ( 2 1 K x x x x ≡ , with the convention 
that .  In the usual multiple regression model it is assumed that   has a normal and 
independent distribution with mean 
1 1 ≡ x y
µ  and standard deviation σ  and takes the 
form β µ x x y E = = ) | ( , where β  is a vector of regression coefficients.  However, this linear 
model does not ensure that the predicted values of y lie within the meaningful interval (0, 1).  
In case of transforming the data and using the equation β x x
y
y









[ln , for estimating y 









 cannot be 
computed.  To overcome these problems GLM introduce a one-to-one continuous 
differentiable transformation ,  (.) G ) ( ) | ( β i i i x G x y E = , where   is called the link  (.) G  29
function and satisfies  ℜ ∈ < < z all for z G       1 ) ( 0 .  For the proportions data  is chosen to 
be the cumulative logistic distribution function 
(.) G
)] exp( 1 /[ ) exp( ) ( ) ( z z z z G + ≡ Λ ≡ .  Further, 
heteroscedasticity would be present since   is unlikely to be constant when ) | ( x y Var 1 0 ≤ ≤ y .  
For this reason, computation of GLM follows under the assumption that  
0       )] ( 1 )[ ( ) | (
2 2 > − = σ β β σ some for x G x G x y Var i i i i   
where,  .  The maximum likelihood estimation procedure is applied to estimate  
with robust standard errors. 
(.) (.) Λ = G i y
 
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
A general description of the methodology used under the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition is 
given below. 
Suppose there are two groups A and B with outcome variable Y and a set of predictors (X). 
We consider a basic linear relationship between these variables given by 
} , { , 0 ) ( , B A l E X Y l l l l l ∈ = + ′ = ε ε β  
where X is the matrix of explanatory variables including a constant, β is the vector of slope 
parameters and intercept term and ε is the error. Then the mean outcome difference between 
the groups is given by 
B B A A
B A
X E X E
Y E Y E R
β β ) ( ) (    
) ( ) (
′ − ′ =
− =
 
This difference can be rearranged into a “three fold decomposition”: 
) ( ] ) ( ) ( [     
) )( (           
] ) ( ) ( [  
B A B A
B A B
B B A
X E X E I and
X E C
X E X E E where









The component E is the “endowments effect” and it determines the expected change in group 
B’s mean outcome if it had group A’s predictor levels. The next component C is the   30
contribution of “differences in coefficients” and measures the expected change in group B’s 
mean outcome if it had group A’s coefficients. This is often used as a measure of 
discrimination. And I is the interaction term which accounts for the fact that differences in 
endowments and coefficients exist simultaneously between the two groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 